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I
n the UK today, the richest tenth
of male earners receive almost
four times as much as the poorest
tenth; 30 years ago they only
earned twice as much. A good
chunk of this increase in wage inequality is
due to higher returns to education (see
Figure 1). Because this has been
accompanied by a massive increase in the
proportion of the university educated, the
inescapable conclusion is that the demand
for more highly skilled workers has risen.
This holds true across the developed
world. The academic consensus is that this
increase in skill demand is linked to
technological progress, driving up the
demand for workers who are able to deal
with a more complex and challenging
workplace.
New facts on inequality have recently
emerged. In the United States, ‘upper half’
inequality – the difference between the
richest tenth of the population and the
middle – has risen continuously over the
last three decades. But after increasing
during the 1980s, ‘lower half’ inequality –
the difference between the middle and
the poorest tenth – has actually fallen
since then (see Figure 2).
And while college graduates’ wages
have continued to increase relative to
those of non-graduates, high school
graduates’ wages (the wages of those
who leave school at age 18) have ceased
to increase relative to those of high-school
dropouts (those who leave at age 16)
since the 1990s. It also seems that jobs in
middle-skilled occupations have decreased
relative to both high-skilled and low-skilled
occupations across Europe and North
America (see Figure 3).
Information technologies
replace mid-level jobs: look
at the cleaning robots
What could account for this ‘polarisation’,
in which the prospects of the middle-
skilled have been declining? One clue is to
be found by looking at robot competitions
in Japan. Every year in Tokyo, the ‘Robo-
One’ competition rewards the robot that is
best at doing tasks such as cleaning,
playing football, dancing and punching
other robots (really hard). What is
Over the last 30 years, inequality has risen as
new technologies have massively increased the
demand for highly skilled workers. But as
research by Guy Michaels and colleagues
shows, it is not simply a case of the more
educated benefiting at the expense of the less
educated; rather, it is the middle-skilled who are
losing out most.
The shrinking middle:
how new technologies are
polarising the labour market 
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remarkable about this competition is 
not so much the sophistication of
Japanese technology, but how bad these
robots are at doing things that humans
find very easy. 
This suggests that what new
technologies – such as information and
communication technologies (ICT) – are
very good at doing is replacing repetitive,
boring, ‘routine’ tasks (Autor et al, 
2003; Goos and Manning, 2007). Tasks
that require responding rapidly to
unfamiliar situations (such as driving or
cleaning) are not easy for robots to
reproduce. Repetitive activities that were
traditionally performed by less educated
workers, such as assembly workers in a car
factory, have been good candidates for job
destruction by new technology. 
But it isn’t only this group that has
been affected. ICT has also reduced the
need for middle-educated workers
carrying out routine tasks. Bank clerks, for
example, have found demand for their
services plummeting as a result of
computerisation – ATMs, online banking
and the like.
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Figure 1:
Increasing returns to higher education: the wage ratio
between all UK workers with a college degree and all UK
workers without a college degree, 1980-2004
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Figure 2:
The divergence of upper half and lower half inequality in
the United States, 1975-2005
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Technology has raised the
demand for college-educated
workers and reduced 
the relative demand for
middle-skilled workers
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Growth in ICT intensity
Note: The figure plots the growth of ICT/VA
(the ratio of information and communication
technology to value added) against the
growth of the highest skill group (the share
of the wage bill going to those with college
education). This is done across the entire
economy of 11 OECD countries between
1980-2004.
More educated workers making
analytical, non-routine use of ICT – such
as management consultants, advertising
executives and physicians – have found
their jobs made easier by ICT rather than
threatened by it. Nor has ICT reduced the
demand for less educated workers
carrying out non-routine manual tasks –
such as janitors and cab drivers – contrary
to claims that low-skilled jobs are
disappearing (see Figure 4). 
Since the number of routine jobs in
the traditional manufacturing sectors (such
as car assembly) declined substantially in
the 1970s, the subsequent growth of
computerisation may have primarily
increased demand for highly educated
workers at the expense of those in the
middle of the educational distribution,
leaving the least educated (mainly working
in non-routine manual jobs) largely
unaffected.
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Figure 3:
Lovely and lousy jobs: employment share growth 
1979-2008 by job quality (occupational wage), UK
Figure 4:
A taxonomy of tasks
Job quality decile (1979 median wage)
Task type Task 
description
Example of 
occupations
Education 
levels
Effect 
of ICT
Change in
demand
Non-manual Clerical,
Book-keepers
Middle Direct 
substitution
Down 5
Non-routine Non-manual Abstract problem
solving (analytic)
mental flexibility
Managers, doctors
lawyers, scientists
High Strongly 
complementary
Up 1
Manual Environmental 
adaptability
Interpersonal
adaptability
Maids, janitors 
security guards
waiters, drivers
Low Broadly 
neutral
Zero
Routine Manual Rules based 
repetitive 
procedural
Assembly line 
workers
Low Direct 
substitution
Down 5
Figure 5:
In countries where technology grew fastest, so did the share of the most highly skilled
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Figure 7:
ICT growth causes big decrease in middle skill share
Figure 6:
ICT growth causes big increase in highest skill share
Figure 8:
ICT growth causes small increase/no change in least skill share
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Growth in ICT intensity
Growth in ICT intensity
Growth in ICT intensity
In industries where technical change was fastest, the 
middle-skilled lost out to the most skilled and the least
skilled: growth of skills shares and ICT, 1980-2004
Note: All three figures plot the growth of ICT/VA (ratio of the information and communication
technology to value added) against the growth of a skill group (the share of the wage bill going to
the education group). This is done across all the traded sectors of 11 OECD countries between
1980-2004. Michaels et al (2010) show this pattern also holds for non-traded sectors.
Substitution of
middle-skilled
workers by high-
skilled workers
is most prevalent
in industries 
with higher R&D
and higher 
use of ICT
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Technology is replacing the
middle-skilled
To look at whether technology is reducing
demand for those in the middle, we have
conducted a simple test using 25 years of
data across 11 countries and all sectors of
the economy. If our story is right, we
would expect industries that had a faster
growth of computerisation to have also
had an increase in demand for college-
educated workers relative to workers with
middle levels of education, leaving the
least skilled unaffected. Our analysis of the
data reveals that this is basically what has
been going on.
After 1980, countries with faster
upgrading of ICT (Finland, the Netherlands,
the UK and the United States) also saw the
most rapid increase in high-skilled workers
(see Figure 5). Across different countries,
similar industries – for example, financial
services, telecommunications and electrical
equipment manufacturers – replaced
middle-skilled workers with high-skilled
workers at the fastest rate.
This finding is consistent with a
technology-based explanation for
polarisation, but not with alternative
explanations that emphasise institutional
changes, such as the decline of 
trade unions or the introduction of
minimum wages.
Changes in skill demand across
industries are strongly correlated with ICT
upgrading. Industries that experienced
more rapid ICT upgrading also increased
the relative demand for high-skilled
workers (see Figure 6) at the expense of
middle-skilled workers (see Figure 7), with
little impact on low-skilled workers (see
Figure 8).
The change in demand reflected an
increase in both the wages and the hours
worked by high-skilled workers relative to
middle-skilled workers. We document this
finding not only for the full sample of
countries together, but also separately for
the United States and for continental
Europe. 
There is also evidence of technology
polarising the demand for skills not only
through increased intensity of ICT.
Industries that engage in more research
and development (R&D) also show the
same pattern of substitution of middle-
skilled workers by high-skilled workers.
Taken together, ICT upgrading and R&D
account for about a quarter of skill
upgrading since 1980. 
What about trade?
An alternative explanation for the falling
demand for non-college workers is
globalisation. The idea is that increased
trade with low-wage countries like China
has depressed the wages and taken the
jobs of the less skilled.
We find that the positive correlation
between trade openness and the increased
demand for high-skilled relative to middle-
skilled disappears once we control for
technological change. This could either
mean no role for trade or a more subtle
effect whereby trade has an indirect effect
by inducing faster technical change (an
effect discussed elsewhere in this
CentrePiece – see page 2).
In either case, unless one believes in a
Luddite view of smashing machines, there
is no reason to erect trade barriers to
protect less skilled workers from the effects
of China, India or other emerging
economies.
Conclusions
Polarisation is not bad news for the least
skilled – there will be jobs for them even in
a high-tech world. But for the middle
classes, technology may be endangering
their future labour market prospects.
This article summarises ‘Has ICT Polarized
Skill Demand? Evidence from Eleven
Countries over 25 Years’ by Guy Michaels,
Ashwini Natraj and John Van Reenen, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 987
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0987.pdf).
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